

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 12, 1980

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: THOMAS THORNTON *RT*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memorandum - Argentine PRC (U)

State has generated a lot of paper for this meeting. At Tab B is a "discussion paper" that was written for the planned, but cancelled, meeting on Argentina two weeks ago. You can skip it. (U)

At Tab A is the issues paper for the current meeting. Although it makes reference to the earlier "discussion paper" it is essentially self-contained. After a three-page discussion of the setting, the paper goes into the mid-range issues in some detail and then concludes with three broad options for policy (pp. 10-11). Not surprisingly, the middle of these options is the policy that was proposed in the old discussion paper. The two surrounding options can be characterized as the "Pat Derian Option" -- a very cool approach to the Argentinians and the "DOD Option" -- which would press ahead more rapidly than we are doing now. There is an annex on Soviet-Argentine relations that you can skip. (S)

I would not recommend that you get involved in the discussion effective by ensuring that some basic considerations are kept in view:

- We are concerned about the growth of Soviet influence in the Southern Cone, Brazil as well as Argentina. We should avoid forcing Argentina to turn to the Soviets, but our main thrust (in private discussions as you did with Martinez, but also publicly) should be to point out that Argentina is approaching a basic choice in its orientation. There is only one way that choice can go, given Argentine history and the anti-Communist rationale used to justify the regime's policies. We should enlist the support of our allies in this. (S)

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Review on May 12, 1986

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- Argentina has given us little to be thankful for on grain sales to the USSR. Their exports have substantially weakened the effectiveness of the grain suspension, and we have no reason to believe they will be more cooperative in the next crop year. Within our overall strategy, we should keep strong pressure on them; attempt to elicit their support (however unlikely); and not be apologetic about our own actions (as State has tended to be). (C)
- We should not gratuitously offend Argentina on human rights and should pay attention to ways of rewarding improvement in their behavior. We should not make a major shift in our policies, however, for their performance is still among the worst in Latin America (see the summary on p. 2 of Tab A). We also must keep the overall credibility of our policy in mind and should not trade off human rights concerns against loosening of their Soviet ties or a cutback in grain sales. Our focus should be on improvement of current practises. The need for an accounting of the "disappeareds" cannot be swept aside although it should not be the prime focus of our approach. (S)
- Military contacts are important and should be encouraged in an inconspicuous way. They should be done in a way that underscores, rather than weakens, our human rights policy. It would be foolhardy to seek any revisions in the legislation at this time to permit us to sell military equipment to Argentina. That would be too clear an abandonment of our human rights policy. This is true even for sale of training, as desirable as that may be in itself. (Madeleine agrees.) (S)

Overall, the choice has to be for Option B. Much, however, will depend on the manner of our presentation. We should be tough with Argentina, not approach them as a suppliant. Through the three visits to B.A., we have made a serious opening bid and have gotten nothing in return except perhaps their decision on the Olympics. If some of our human rights people have been overly zealous they may need to be reined in a bit, but the essence of the problem is in Argentine performance, not our reaction to it. (S)

Bob Pastor points out that Argentina was not helpful to us at San Jose, partly in deference to Cuba. Add to this their failure to carry through on their promises to ratify Tlatelolco and their other shortcomings and we have a picture of a pretty

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tough case. We should handle it that way, while trying to get Argentina to shape up on issues of importance to us. (S)

Addendum (I): Our commercial relations with Argentina are not part of the agenda but may be raised by Luther Hodges. The most important pending item is OPIC guarantees for US involvement in a hydroelectric project, affecting both Argentina and Paraguay. The relevant human rights legislation is apparently ironclad and precludes OPIC support. Yet Hodges has just completed a trip to Argentina to promote US sales of hydroelectric equipment! The Christopher committee will meet on this one Thursday and Linc and I will try to find a reasonable solution to this silly situation. It looks, however, like we may be in a legal straight-jacket. (C)

Addendum (II): Brazil is also not specifically on the agenda and although we are of course concerned about Soviet blandishments there, I see no issue that needs PRC consideration. Ambassador Sayre wrote to Harold Brown (who sent a copy of the letter to you -- Tab C) about exchange of military visits. That, however, can be handled routinely. (C)

Clearances: Lincoln Bloomfield (in draft)  
Tim Deal (" " )  
Jerry Oplinger (" " )

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

5 MAY 1980



MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PETER TARNOFF, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE  
SECRETARY AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COLONEL LESLIE G. DENEND, SPECIAL ASSISTANT  
TO THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Secretary Brown has requested that the attached letter be  
forwarded to you for your principals' review as background  
for a PRC on Latin America which he expects to be scheduled  
soon.

*Carl R. Smith*

Carl R. Smith  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Military Assistant to the  
Secretary of Defense

Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Brasilia, Brazil

April 23, 1980

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The Honorable  
Harold Brown  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C.

Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP

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IPS by W Date 12-14-10

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In view of your strong and continuing interest in the security relationship with Brazil, I thought that I should provide you with a current summary. We have over the past two years, with the help of your staff and the Department of State, been able to put in place a new framework for a useful and continuing security relationship with Brazil.

Your approval of the assignment of a general/flag officer as your representative and Defense Attache in Brasilia was, in retrospect, the key to developing a new security relationship with Brazil. This decision was welcomed within the Brazilian Armed Forces as a mark of respect for Brazil and has now been reciprocated with the assignment by each of the Brazilian Armed Services of a general/flag officer to Washington. It has been a strong lesson on the extreme importance Brazil, and incidentally other Latin countries, attach to the appearance and substance of equality and mutual respect. I must also note that the quality of the general officer selected--General Wiegand--has been an important factor.

The visit here in March of General Allen and the return visit of the Chief of the Brazilian Air Force began the process of re-establishing contact at the Service Chief

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level. The visit here in October, 1979, of Admiral Train had already re-established contact at the fleet commander level. The visit here of the Director of the Joint [Chiefs] Staff in April laid the basis for continuing consultation between the general staffs of the two Armed Forces. We were most fortunate that Admiral Hanson had served in Brazil and spoke Portuguese. Although the Brazilian General Staff was not willing to commit itself formally to return consultations in Washington later this year, I am reasonably confident that the Brazilian President will approve in due course.

We have also made progress in re-establishing a supply and training relationship. We have some internal management problems on handling the increased workload but we should resolve that over the next few months. The Brazilian Naval Minister told me on April 19 that the Brazilian Navy would be participating in an amphibious exercise in the Caribbean this year and accepting the offer of helicopter assistance in constructing the Trinidad naval facility. The annual UNITAS naval exercise is continuing and has, of course, been an important factor in sustaining the relationship.

Despite the progress, it is clear from the DAO report on the April meeting between the staffs of the two Armed Forces that there remain strong doubts within the Brazilian Armed Services about the reliability of the United States as a security partner. It will be some time yet before there is a feeling of genuine confidence. I am very mindful of the need for Brazilian cooperation on surveillance of Soviet activity in the South Atlantic, but I doubt, even in the present state of improved relations, that Brazil is ready to engage in such cooperation. With the continuing help of your staff we will do everything we can to secure Brazilian cooperation.

One further step I would like to suggest is reciprocal visits between the Service Secretaries. Because Brazil maintains completely separate Services, the three Brazilian Armed Services Ministers are key elements in the relationship and on policy making within the Brazilian Government.

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My first candidate for such an invitation would be the Brazilian Navy Minister the last quarter of 1980.

I agree with the Defense Attache here that the course of action for the rest of 1980 should be consolidation of the efforts already undertaken and positive performance on those efforts instead of significant new initiatives. If we can do that, prospects are reasonably good that Brazilian cooperation will be more forthcoming on our operational requirements.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,



Robert M. Sayre  
Ambassador

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